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ABSTRACT
Increasing affordability of genome sequencing and, as a conse-
quence, widespread availability of genomic data opens up new
opportunities for the field of medicine, as also evident from the
emergence of popular cloud-based offerings in this area, such as
Google Genomics. To utilize this data more efficiently, it is crucial
that different entities share their data with each other. However,
such data sharing is risky mainly due to privacy concerns. In this
paper, we attempt to provide a privacy-preserving and efficient
solution for the “similar patient search” problem among several
parties (e.g., hospitals) by addressing the shortcomings of previous
attempts. We consider a scenario in which each hospital has its
own genomic dataset and the goal of a physician (or researcher)
is to search for a patient similar to a given one (based on a ge-
nomic makeup) among all the hospitals in the system. To enable
this search, we let each hospital encrypt its dataset with its own
key and outsource the storage of its dataset to a public cloud. The
physician can get an authorization frommultiple hospitals and send
a query to the cloud, which efficiently performs the search across
authorized hospitals using a privacy-preserving index structure.
We propose a hierarchical index structure to index each hospital’s
dataset with low memory requirement. Furthermore, we develop a
novel privacy-preserving index merging mechanism that generates
a common search index from individual indices of each hospital to
significantly improve the search efficiency. We also consider the
storage of medical information associated with genomic data of
a patient (e.g., diagnosis and treatment). We allow access to this
information via a fine-grained access control policy that we develop
through the combination of standard symmetric encryption and
ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption. Using this mechanism,
a physician can search for similar patients and obtain medical in-
formation about the matching records if the access policy holds.
We conduct experiments on large-scale genomic data and show the
efficiency of the proposed scheme. Notably, we show that under our
experimental settings, for large query sizes (e.g., when the query in-
cludes a large portion of a patient’s genotype), the proposed scheme
is more than 60 times faster than Wang et al.’s protocol [38] and
more than 95 times faster than Asharov et al.’s [5] and Thomas et
al.’s [33] solutions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Thanks to the sharp cost reduction in the whole genome sequenc-
ing, today, digital genomes are used in many applications such as
paternity tests [30], personalized medicine [40], and genetic com-
patibility tests [21]. Among these uses of genomic data, arguably
the most important one is in healthcare. Physicians now treat their
patients based on their genetic makeup. They provide different
prescriptions to patients having the same disease but with different
genetic makeup. Thus, it is very valuable for a physician to identify
other patients that are in similar conditions to their patient to get
more insight about the diagnosis and treatment procedures. How-
ever, doing such a search in a broad fashion (e.g., nation-wide) has
many unique challenges as we discuss in the following.
Confidentiality of genomic data and affiliated sensitive in-
formation (ASI). There has already been several privacy concerns
raised related to genomic data [22, 34]. Since genomic data includes
information about an individual’s phenotype, ethnicity, familymem-
bers, disease conditions, and more, if it falls into wrong hands, the
consequences may be as serious as genetic discrimination (e.g.,
in healthcare or employment). Genomic data is often associated
with the medical condition of a patient, including diagnosis, treat-
ment, and symptoms. We refer to this information as “affiliated
sensitive information” (ASI) of the patient. For instance, a mutation
in the BRCA gene is recognized as a major contributor for breast
cancer [17], similarly the treatment of many cancer types are de-
termined based on the genetic makeup of a patient. Protecting the
confidentiality of patients’ genomic data and ASI is essential for the
hospitals, and hence, hospitals are not willing to open their datasets
to each other or share their datasets with a public cloud service
provider (CSP). Therefore, genomic data sharing mechanisms that
provide privacy guarantees to the hospitals about their datasets
are required to pave the way to an efficient and privacy-preserving
nation-wide similar patient search protocol.
Efficiency of the search process. The search process to identify
a target genome sequence (i.e., a similar patient) should be efficient.
However, considering the scale of genomic data and the scale of the
search (i.e., number of hospitals and the number of patients in each
hospital), providing an efficient protocol along with the privacy
goals is not trivial. One obvious approach is to apply index struc-
tures (e.g., suffix tree, prefix tree, or binary tree) to make the search
process more efficient. However, such indexing techniques cannot
be directly applied for the genome search due to (i) size of genomic
data, (ii) variation of genomic data between individuals (e.g., mu-
tations), and (iii) the aforementioned privacy requirements. Thus,
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new techniques are required to provide both privacy guarantees
and efficiency for similar patient search problem.
Search over several parties. Searching for similar patients ismore
effective and helpful if the physician can search datasets of more
hospitals. Previous studies assume the physician to query all hos-
pitals individually (one-by-one), however such a strategy is both
time consuming and unreliable since it requires the cooperation of
each hospital in real-time. Instead, it would be easier if all hospitals
outsource their datasets to a common entity (e.g., a CSP) and the
physician directly queries this CSP. However, such an approach is
not trivial due to privacy concerns. Furthermore, as new hospitals
join the system, or as the datasets of the existing hospitals change,
data stored at the CSP should be updated and this may cause ad-
ditional cost. Therefore, we need new solutions to share datasets
among several hospitals in a privacy-preserving and efficient way.
In this paper, to the best of our knowledge, we propose the first
framework to tackle all these challenges. We propose a scheme in
which each hospital encrypts its own dataset (with its unique key)
and outsources the storage and processing for the search operation
to a CSP. For privacy, we encrypt genomic data with a standard
encryption algorithm and propose a novel indexing mechanism
for privacy-preserving search. The proposed indexing mechanism
provides not only privacy, but also the ability to search over several
hospitals’ datasets in an efficient way. Each hospital encrypts its
own dataset independently while the searchability of ciphertext is
enabled across all the hospitals through this indexing mechanism.
In order to achieve efficient search and outsource computation-
intensive tasks to the CSP, we propose two mechanisms to advance
the proposed indexing scheme. First, we propose a hierarchical
clustering algorithm and a hierarchical index structure to accelerate
the search process. Second, we introduce a privacy-preserving index
merging algorithm to avoid CSP sequentially searching over all
the stored hierarchical index structures (e.g., belonging to different
hospitals) one-by-one. To enable the ASI to be properly accessible
by legitimate clients, we also introduce an ASI sharing scheme.
Considering the fine-grained access requirement, we adopt chosen
policy attribute-based encryption (CPABE). In addition, to enable
participants to use different secret keys to encrypt the ASI, we
introduce a re-encryption mechanism. We implement and evaluate
the proposed scheme under various scenarios. Also, we show that
compared with the state-of-the-art, the proposed scheme performs
more than 60 times faster than Wang et al.’s protocol [38] and more
than 95 times faster than Asharov et al.’s [5] and Thomas et al.’s [33]
schemes, especially for large query sizes.
2 RELATEDWORK
Privacy of genomic data has been recently a very active research
topic [31]. Several privacy-preserving solutions have been pro-
posed for processing of genomic data in different settings, including
personalized medicine [9], research [25, 29], alignment [14], and
management of raw genomic data [7].
There has been many earlier work on privacy-preserving pair-
wise comparison of genomes (or identification of a pattern in a
given DNA sequence). Atallah et al. proposed a privacy-preserving
edit distance protocol based on dynamic programming [6]. Com-
putational efficiency of this work was later improved by Jha et
al. [24]. Troncoso-Pastoriza et al. proposed a protocol to execute
finite state machine (FSM) in an oblivious manner [36]. Yasuda et
al. applied somewhat homomorphic encryption (SWHE) to imple-
ment privacy-preserving Hamming distance computation of two
genome sequences [41]. Cheon et al. used SWHE to implement
secure edit distance computation of two genome sequences [16].
Wang et al. proposed a scheme for DNA sequence matching with
only one-round of interaction [37]. Sousa et al. combined SWHE
and private information retrieval (PIR) to implement secure search
over outsourced VCF files [35]. Cheng et al. proposed secret sharing
(using two non-colluding public clouds) for similarity computation
between genome sequences [15]. Although these schemes are use-
ful for pairwise comparison of genomes (or comparison of a pattern
and a genome), they cannot be generalized for 1-to-n comparison
between the genomes easily due to efficiency and practicality issues,
and hence they are not applicable for the similar patient search
problem.
Similar to our proposed work, privacy-preserving similar patient
search has been considered by a few works. Wang et al. proposed
an efficient genome-wide, privacy-preserving similar patient query
scheme for two parties [38]. In their scheme, the edit distance of
two genome sequences is transformed into finding the number of
different elements between two sets. Asharov et al. addressed the
same problem by pre-processing genome sequences into proper
fragments before comparison. Both these works assume that ge-
nomic data is stored at local datasets (e.g., each hospital storing its
own genomic dataset) and the client (physician) looks for the top
k-closest sequences at each local dataset. This makes the search
process impractical since both schemes require each hospital to be
available all the time and responsive to the queries. Schneider et
al. [33] adapted Asharow et al.’s solution to support outsourcing.
In a nutshell, their scheme is a secret sharing-based mechanism,
in which the data owners outsource the database storage to two
semi-trusted service providers. A client’s query is generated by
interacting with these service providers. Schneider et al.’s scheme
relies on the existence of more than one (semi) trusted and non-
colluding entities. Furthermore, hospitals are typically reluctant to
outsource their medical datasets to cloud-based service providers
without encryption. Therefore, secret sharing-based solutions, al-
though efficient, are not practical for real-life implementation of
this scenario.
Our contribution. As opposed to previous work, here, we pro-
vide a significantly more practical and efficient solution by letting
the hospitals outsource the storage of their datasets to a cloud ser-
vice provider (CSP) in a privacy-preserving way. To provide the
privacy of outsourced data, we let each data owner (hospital) en-
crypt its data with its unique cryptographic key. Thus, as opposed
to similar work that use a CSP to process data frommultiple sources,
we avoid single point-of-failure by encrypting all the outsourced
data with different keys. We also consider a dynamic system in
which new hospitals join by uploading their datasets to the CSP
in an efficient way. We provide these functionalities via a novel
indexing scheme and a novel privacy-preserving index merging
algorithm. Our evaluation results on real genomic data shows that
the proposed scheme provides more than 60 times better perfor-
mance (in terms of run-time) than Wang et al.’scheme [38] and
more than 95 times better performance than Asharov et al.’s [5]
and Thomas et al.’s [33] schemes, especially for large query sizes
(e.g., including large number of point mutations).
Furthermore, we consider controlled access to affiliated sensi-
tive information (ASI) such as diagnosis, treatment, or symptoms
that can be associated with genomic information. We provide fine-
grained access control to ASI so that an authorized physician can
not only identify similar patients but she can also obtain medical
information about them.
3 BACKGROUND
Here, we provide brief background information about genomics
and less-common cryptographic primitives we use in this work. We
provide the background about more common primitives such as
asymmetric bilinear groups and Bloom filters in Appendix A.
3.1 Genomics Background
The most common mutation in human population is called single
nucleotide polymorphism (SNP). It is the variation in a single nu-
cleotide at a particular position of the genome [32]. There are about
5 million SNPs observed per individual and sensitive information
about individuals (such as disease predispositions) are typically
inferred by analyzing the SNPs. Two kinds of nucleotides (or al-
leles) are observed for each SNP: (i) major allele is the one that
is observed with a high frequency and (ii) minor allele is the one
that is observed with low frequency. The frequency of the minor
allele in a given population is denoted as the minor allele frequency
(MAF). Each SNP includes two nucleotides, one inherited from the
father and the other one from mother. For simplicity, we represent
the value of a SNP i as the number of its minor alleles, and hence
SNPi ∈ {0, 1, 2}. A SNP is represented by an (ID, value) pair, where
the ID is taken from a large standardized set of strings and the value
is in {0, 1, 2}. In the following sections, if we mention a SNP (or
SNPs) without mentioning the ID or value, we mean both parts.
3.2 Ciphertext Policy Attribute-Based
Encryption (CPABE)
CPABE enables controlled access to encrypted data [10]. It consists
of the following four algorithms.
Setup. Outputs the public parameters PK and a master key MKi
given a security parameter.
Encrypt(PK,M,A). Takes as input public parameters PK, a message
M , and an access structure A over the universe of attributes. The
algorithm encryptsM and produces a ciphertext CT such that only
a client that possesses a set of attributes that satisfy the access
structure A can decrypt CT.
Key Generation(MKi , S). Outputs a private key sk given the mas-
ter key MKi and a set of attributes S.
Decrypt(PK, CT, sk). Takes as input public parameters PK, a ci-
phertext CT, which contains an access policy A, and sk, which is a
private key for a set S of attributes. If S satisfies the access struc-
ture A, then the algorithm decrypts the ciphertxt CT and returns a
message M.
3.3 Customized Bloom Filter
Comparedwith the standard Bloom filter (BF ), the customized Bloom
filter (CBF ) uses one perfect hash function instead of k normal hash
functions. The perfect hash function [20] for a set of data items is
a hash function that maps distinct elements in the set to a set of
integers with no collisions. These integers are further utilized as
indices of a bit array and corresponding values are set to 1. In the
remaining of the paper, if we do not specify the type of the Bloom
filter, then it is the standard one.
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Figure 1: System model. The certificated institution (CI) is
responsible for sequencing the submitted samples. The data
owner (DO) (e.g., hospital) processes its data and outsources
it to the cloud service provider (CSP). If a client wants to
access the outsourced data, she needs to get authorization
from the DO(s). After obtaining the authorization from the
DO, the client sends a request to the CSP for target data. The
CSP processes the request and sends the result to the client.
4 PROBLEM FORMULATION
Here, we introduce our system, threat, and query models.
4.1 System Model
As shown in Figure 1, our proposed model consists of four entities:
data owner (DO), certificated institution (CI), cloud service provider
(CSP), and client (e.g., physician). The DO can be considered as the
hospital. The hospital collects biological samples from patients
with their consent and sends the samples to the CI for sequencing.
The CI is an authority or trusted institution that is responsible for
sequencing DNA and generating the VCF files (the file format to
store the SNPs of individuals). Upon receiving VCF files from the CI,
hospital first processes them (e.g., generating the complementing
ASI, indexing, and encryption) and then, outsources the storage
of the encrypted dataset to the CSP. The CSP stores the uploaded
encrypted datasets and responds to the queries of the clients for
similar patient search. After a client is authenticated by a hospital
(e.g., to make sure that she is a legitimate physician), she can issue
a query to the CSP to search over the stored data belonging to the
corresponding hospital(s). Upon receiving the search result from
the CSP, the client further processes the retrieved result and obtains
the plaintext response.
4.2 Threat Model
We assume that the CI is a trusted party, which is consistent with
the previous work [7, 8].
The CI is only responsible for the sequencing. Due to the nature
of today’s sequencing technology, existence of such a trusted CI
is a mandatory assumption for all existing schemes. The CSP is
assumed to be semi-honest, following the common practice in this
area [5, 38]. Under this assumption, the CSP follows the protocol
honestly and may be curious to infer stored data by analyzing the
received queries and the stored data. Hospitals may be curious about
the client’s queries. Similarly, client may be curious about hospitals’
sensitive information (genomic information and ASI stored at the
CSP). In the proposed scheme, if the CSP and one of the participating
hospitals collude, the CSP may launch a brute-force attack to infer
the SNP IDs and values contained in the indices of other hospitals.
In this paper, we do not consider such a collusion. We briefly discuss
the main threats against the proposed protocol in the following.
Ciphertext attack. The CSP may attempt to infer the sensitive
information of the hospitals by analyzing stored encrypted data.
Query attack. The CSP observes and processes the query from the
client, and hence it may try to infer the query content (i.e., genomic
data of the patient being queried).
Illegitimate access attack. The client may try to access genomic
data or ASI from a hospital’s dataset without the authorization of
the corresponding hospital.
4.3 Query Model
The query model is designed to provide the following functionality:
given a (partial) sequence of SNPs representing a set of mutations
for a patient, retrieve ASIs of patients whose mutations are similar
to those of the given sequence. The input sequence does not need
to include all mutations for a patient because the focus on the query
can be on a specific pattern that includes a number of SNPs. The
search is performed across the data from multiple hospitals under
the constraint of access control.
To prevent the CSP from learning the SNPs in the query input,
the client transforms the input in the following way. First, the client
creates a Bloom filter and populates this filter with each input SNP.
Then, the client extracts the positions of non-zero elements inside
the Bloom filter and applies a pseudorandom function to each ex-
tracted position using a secret key as the seed. The result of this
operation is used for the index search. Second, the client creates a
query token for each input SNP by applying a hash function and
encrypting the hash output with her private key. The outcome
of this is used for the ASI search. We present the details of these
operations in Section 5.3 and discuss their privacy in Section 6. We
also let the client customize the search query by introducing two
search parameters as follows:
The threshold for similaritymetric (εc ). Since each client c may
require a different level of similarity for a match, c should be al-
lowed to set its own minimum acceptable similarity value. In the
proposed scheme, the threshold for similarity metric is equivalent
to the minimum similarity score of the cosine metric. In the search
phase, it is used to evaluate whether the match for a patient exceeds
the threshold.
The threshold for the number of retrieved results (kc ). The
number of retrieved result is not predictable. Considering the con-
straints on the client’s capacity, bandwidth, and personal preference,
a client should be allowed to set the maximum number for the re-
trieved result. In the proposed scheme, this parameter is used to
control the size of search result.
5 PROPOSED SCHEME
5.1 Overview
In order to perform similarity search, we use an index produced by
hierarchical clustering. Building an index is an expensive procedure,
which is performed by the cloud infrequently in an offline fashion.
Once built, the index allows us to efficiently handle many queries
on a daily basis. Due to privacy concerns, the cloud cannot build the
index from scratch using the plaintext records. Therefore, a hospital
first creates an encrypted index and sends it to the cloud, which
subsequently performs hierarchical clustering. Additionally, the
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Figure 2: Initialization: The initialization process is con-
ducted per hospital. It includes six modules: Setup, Index-
Gen, SNPEncrypt, ASIEncrypt, HierarchialIndexGen, and In-
dexMerge. The first four modules are sequentially executed
by the hospital and output a privacy-preserving index and
encrypted data. Each hospital sends its output to the CSP
and theCSP callsHierarchicalIndexGen to construct a hierar-
chical index based on the input. CSP calls IndexMerge when
the number of hierarchical indices exceeds a threshold.
cloud needs to combine indices sent by different hospitals because
a single query can search across multiple hospitals. The cloud can
either keep and search individual hospital indices separately or
merge them into a single index. Using individual indices may be
more efficient when there are only a few hospitals whereas at a
larger scale, it is better to merge indices. The cloud uses a heuristic
to determine which scheme to employ.
We divide the solution into three phases: initialization, client
authorization, and query processing, as shown in Figures 2, 3, and
4, respectively. The initialization is performed infrequently, depend-
ing how dynamic the system is. The client authorization can be
performed periodically, in line with common practices. The query
processing is performed each time a user wants to send a search
query. Each phase consists of a number of procedures, which are
also summarized in Table 8 in Appendix B. We first present an
overview of the procedures and then, provide their detailed descrip-
tions.
In the initialization phase (shown in Figure 2), each hospital
first calls the Setup function. Setup chooses the initial parameters,
configures library functions, and then preprocesses the dataset (e.g.,
by adding ASI to associated SNPs).
After performing Setup, each hospital runs the IndexGen algo-
rithm to build an index over its genomic data. The index is generated
based on the genome similarity of its patients. Then, the encryp-
tion algorithms SNPEncrypt and ASIEncrypt are called to encrypt
the genome sequences and corresponding ASIs. To outsource the
computation-intensive tasks to the CSP, the hospital directly sends
the generated index and encrypted data to the CSP without building
a hierarchial index over it. Upon receiving the encrypted index, the
CSP runs the HierarchicalIndexGen algorithm to build a hierarchical
index in order to improve the search efficiency. Since each hospital
outsources its indices to the CSP, the number of hierarchical indices
stored at the CSP increases with the number of hospitals. If the
number of hierarchical indices is beyond a certain threshold (that is
determined by considering the efficiency of the search operation),
the CSP calls the IndexMerge function to merge all the hierarchical
indices into one. We analyze the value of this threshold in Section 7.
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Figure 3: Client authorization: If a client wants to access
a hospital’s data, the authorization from the hospital is re-
quired. The client first sends an authorization request to the
hospital. If the hospital approves the request, a token adjust-
ment key is generated and sent to the CSP in addition to a
successful authorization reply that is sent to the client.
If a client wants to perform a similar patient search, she first
need to get authorization from a hospital before she can generate a
valid query. Figure 3 shows the process of client authorization. The
client sends an authorization request to a hospital. If the hospital
approves the request, it generates a key for token adjustment and
sends it to the CSP. Then, the hospital sends additional secret keys
to the client, as described in Section 5.3.
Once the client gets the authorization from a hospital, she can
query the dataset of that hospital. An important advantage of our
scheme is that the client can get an authorization from multiple
hospitals and later send a single query to perform a search across
all of them. Figure 4 shows the flow of query processing. The client
first calls the QueryGen function to generate the first part of her
query, which is used to search for the pseudonyms of the target
similar patients. Then, the TokenGen function is called to construct
tokens as the second part of the query, which is used to retrieve
the target ASIs. Token is constructed by encrypting client’s input
SNPs and it is adjusted using the token adjustment key (that is
generated by the hospital and sent to the CSP). The adjusted token
is used to provide controlled (or authorized) access to the client to
the hospital’s data. Upon receiving the query, the CSP first calls
either Search or SearchOverMergedIndex function, depending on
whether the algorithm IndexMerge has been called or not, with the
first part of the query to retrieve the pseudonyms of target similar
patients.
If the output of the first step is non-empty, the CSP adjusts the
token using the second part of the query by running TokenAdjust.
Finally, the CSP calls the ASISearch function to retrieve the ASIs
belonging to the retrieved target patients. The result is sent back to
the client. The client decrypts the received ciphertext by running
ASIDecrypt and obtains the plaintext ASIs of the corresponding
target patients.
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Figure 4: Query processing: A legitimate client first runs
QueryGen and TokenGen to generate a query and sends it
to the CSP. Upon receiving the query, the CSP runs either
Search or SearchOverMergedIndex based on whether the CSP
has merged the hierarchical indices. If the output is empty,
the search process is terminated. Otherwise, the CSP calls
TokenAdjust to adjust tokens before ASISearch is conducted.
The outcome is sent to the client. The client runsASIDecrypt
to obtain the plaintext ASIs of the similar patients.
5.2 Initialization
As shown in Figure 2, the initialization consists of six modules:
Setup, IndexGen, SNPEncrypt,ASIEncrypt,HierarchicalIndexGen, and
IndexMerge. The first four modules are done at each hospital and
the remaining modules are done at the CSP.
To initialize the system, a trusted party that is in charge of key
generation and distribution (such as the NIH) sets an asymmetric
bilinear group (G1,G2,GT ,p, e), where G1 and G2 are two distinct
groups of orderp, and e is the mapping from these two groups to the
target group GT . In addition, the settings (i.e., size and maximum
false positive rate) of the standard Bloom filter BF and customized
Bloom filter CBF are configured. After that, three hash functions
(H0, H1, H2) are chosen. These hash functions are used in the algo-
rithms that will be discussed later. Subsequently, a pseudorandom
function (PRF) F is chosen and a secret key K is selected. We list
the frequently used notations in Table 9 (in Appendix C).
5.2.1 Setup (at the hospital) - Setup. In the first step of the Setup,
all the initial parameters and functions are selected. In the second
step, dataset is preprocessed.
The following steps are the same for all hospitals, and hence we
describe them only for an hospital i . Hospital i first generates two
symmetric encryption keys, Kαi and Kβi for the SNP encryption
and ASI encryption, respectively. Then, it chooses a secret key Ki
for the shared key generation. Furthermore, a public/private key
pair (PKi,1, SKi ) is generated for the signature and a public/master
key pair (PKi,2,MKi ) is generated for CPABE.
Next, the hospital starts preprocessing the dataset. The two
phases of dataset preprocessing are shown in Figure 5. In the first
SNP.0 SNP.1 SNP.1 SNP.2
SNP.ID SNP.1 SNP.2 SNP.3 SNP.4 SNP.5
SNP.2
insert
0 1 1 1 0 1 11bfIDi
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Figure 5: Dataset preprocessing. The pair of SNP ID and
value is first classified based on a certain property (e.g., its
association with a disease) and then associated with an ASI.
Afterwards, the concatenation of SNP.ID and SNP.val is in-
serted into a Bloom filter. This generates the non-zero ele-
ments of the Bloom filter associated with ASIs.
phase, the hospital adds a pseudonym for each patient record and
ASIs for various groups of SNPs. The association between the ASIs
and the SNPs can be determined based on several factors such as
disease, phenotype, or treatment. Eventually, data record belong-
ing to a patient IDi is represented as {IDi , {sASI1IDi ,SNP,ASI1)}, . . .,
{sASIkIDi ,SNP,ASIk )}}, where s
ASIk
IDi ,SNP
represents a set of SNPs of indi-
vidual IDi (and their values) that are associated with ASIk . In the
second phase, the concatenation of each SNP ID (represented by
SNP.ID) and SNP value (represented by SNP.val) is mapped into a
Bloom filter, denoted as bfIDi (shown in Figure 5). Eventually, this
process generates the non-zero elements of the Bloom filter output
that are associated with the ASIs of the corresponding patient.
5.2.2 Index generation (at the hospital) - IndexGen. Each hospi-
tal indexes the records of its patients using a Bloom filter. The index
generation algorithm is used to encrypt and randomize the non-
zero elements of the Bloom filter. The same algorithm is also used
to generate the query (as discussed in Section 5.4.1). The details of
the index generation (IndexGen) algorithm are given in Appendix D.
The input of the IndexGen algorithm at hospital i are the secret key
K , the pseudorandom function (PRF) F , the dictionary DictBFi , and
the public/private key pair (PKi,1, SKi ).
For each pseudonym IDi in the dictionary DictBFi , hospital i con-
nects the entry DictBFi [ID] to the corresponding Bloom filter (bfIDi )
that is constructed using the genome of patient with pseudonym
IDi . If the value of a positionpos in the Bloom filter bfIDi (bfIDi [pos])
is non-zero, then that position is extracted and input into the PRF F
with the secret key K . The CSP may understand if a patient exists
in different hospitals’ datasets and obtain more information about
the patient in that way. To avoid this, the hospital selects a random
string ri and invokes F with the inputs ri and previous outcome
of F . Since ri is a random string, the newly generated result is in-
distinguishable from a random input. The output is added into a
customized Bloom filter cbfIDi . Once all the non-zero elements of
1 1 1 0 0 1 0bfIDi 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 10cbfIDi
pos
ID1
IDi
IDn
bfID1
bfIDi
bfIDn
Dictionary
1 3 7
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cbfIDi
cbfIDn
Dictionary
1
F(KPRF,	pos)
r random string
F(r,	 1)
Customized	Bloom	filter
Standard	Bloom	filter
2
insert
Figure 6: Mapping from a standard Bloom filter to a cus-
tomized Bloom filter. Given a standard Bloom filter, all the
positions (pos) of non-zero elements are extracted and en-
crypted by using a secret key as one of the inputs of a PRF.
To randomize the result (ζ1), a random string (r ) is selected
and the PRF (F ) is invoked anew with input of the random
string and previous outcome. The result (ζ2) is mapped into
a customized Bloom filter.
the Bloom filter bfIDi are mapped into the customized Bloom filter
cbfIDi , the pair (IDi , cbfIDi ) is added into the dictionary Dict
CBF
i .
This process is also shown in Figure 6. To verify the authenticity
of the index, hospital i digitally signs the hash of the concatenation
of PKi,1 and ri by using SKi . The output of the algorithm is a tuple
(∆i , ri , σi ), where σi is the signature, ri is the random string applied
to build the index, and ∆i consists of DictBFi and PKi,1.
5.2.3 Data Encryption (at the hospital) - SNPEncrypt and ASIEn-
crypt. Data encryption consists of two parts. The first part is the
encryption of the genome (i.e., SNPs) and the second part is the ASI
encryption. For genome encryption, we propose SNPEncrypt which
utilizes the AES encryption algorithm. The input of the algorithm
is the secret key Kαi and a set Si,SNP of SNPs stored at hospital i .
The output is a set Ci,SNP of encrypted genomes.
The ASI encryption algorithm at hospital i includes two rounds
of AES encryption with two different secret keys (as also shown
in Figure 9 in Appendix E). In the first round, the secret key Kβi
is used and in the second round, a secret key Kγi that is randomly
selected from the group GT is applied to encrypt the ciphertext
from the first round. Kβi is held by hospital i and it is only shared
with the approved clients. Kγi is encrypted using CPABE, which
enables the access policy for the ASI. We describe the ASIEncrypt
algorithm in the following. The details of the algorithm are also
given in Appendix D.
The input of the algorithm includes two keys Ki and Kβi and
a dictionary DictASIi . Each item in the dictionary consists of two
components. The first component is the pseudonym of a patient
(IDi ) and the second component is a list of ASIs belonging to the
patient. For each pseudonym IDi in the dictionary DictASIi , hospi-
tal i conducts the following operations. For each pair of ASI and
SASIIDi ,SNP inside theDict
ASI
i [IDi ], the hospital executes following four
steps. First, for each SNP in set SASIIDi ,SNP, the hospital calls the hash
function H2 with a randomly selected value τ and bilinear map-
ping e(H1(v),д2)1/Ki , where v is the concatenation of SNP.ID and
its corresponding value SNP.val. The random value τ enables the
hash result h be indistinguishable from a random string. The re-
sult h is added into a set θ . Second, the AES encryption algorithm
(AES.Enc) is called to encrypt ASI with input key Kβi and it outputs
the ciphertext C1. Third, a key Kγi is chosen from GT and AES.Enc
is called again to encrypt C1 with Kγi , resulting in ciphertext C2.
Fourth, the secret key Kγi is encrypted using CPABE with policy
A built from the set θ . Specifically, all the elements inside θ are
considered as attributes of the access policy. The output ciphertext
C3 accompanied withC2 and τ are added into a ciphertext set CIDi .
After all the ASIs of DictASI[IDi ] are encrypted, the pair(IDi ,CIDi )
is inserted into a dictionary DictCi . Once this operation is done for
all the patients (i.e., all the IDs have been processed), the algorithm
outputs the dictionary DictCi .
5.2.4 Hierarchical index generation (at the CSP) - HierarchicalIn-
dexGen. The hierarchical clustering algorithm is designed to cluster
the Bloom filters representing the genome sequences into hierarchi-
cal clusters. Also, a hierarchical index structure is designed to index
all the hierarchical clusters with small memory requirement. The
CSP builds hierarchical index based on the received (unclustered)
index from each hospital i . The hierarchical index allows to search
the target patient efficiently. Figure 7 illustrates the hierarchical
index structure and construction of hierarchical customized Bloom
filters. The details of the algorithm are also given in Appendix D.
The key part of the hierarchical clustering algorithm is setting
the similarity metric, as it determines the quality of clustering.
Instead of using traditional Euclidean distance as the similarity
metric, in which one of the dimensions may be relatively large
and may overpower the other dimensions, we choose the cosine
similarity. Thus, in our protocol, the similarity metric is calculated
as Sim(cbfIDi , cbfIDj )=
cbfIDi ·cbfIDj
|cbfIDi | · |cbfIDj |
, where cbfIDi and cbfIDj are
two customized Bloom filters for patients IDi and IDj , respectively.
Also, |cbfIDi | and |cbfIDj | represent the lengths of cbfIDi and cbfIDj .
The inner product of Bloom filters cbfIDi and cbfIDj is equal to
the sum of bitwise AND of cbfIDi and cbfIDj since each element
of a Bloom filter is either 0 or 1. The efficiency of computing the
similarity score is enhanced by the bitwise operation.
We use a similarity matrix to keep the pairwise similarity values
between different Bloom filters representing genome sequences.
Given the similarity matrix, the pairwise distances (i.e., 1-similarity
value) can be easily calculated. Then, the multidimensional scaling
(MDS) algorithm [12] is invoked to compute the relative positions
of genome sequences. Based on the relative positions, the classic
hierarchical clustering algorithm is applied. For this, we use the
classic Ward variance minimization algorithm [39].
We describe the HierarchicalIndexGen algorithm below. The in-
put of the algorithm is ∆i consisting of DictCBFi , PKi,1, and ri . The
CSP first extracts the dictionary DictCBFi from ∆i . Then, the hierar-
chical clustering algorithm (denoted by HC) is called with the input
DictCBFi . The outcome consists of a tree structure Tri and a new
dictionary DictHi . Finally, the tree structure Tri , dictionary Dict
H
i ,
public key PKi,1, and ri are gathered into a new tuple ∆Hi .
In Figure 7, we provide a toy example illustrating index struc-
ture and index construction process of hierarchical customized
ID7
ID5 ID6
ID1 ID2 ID3 ID4
ID1
ID2
ID3
ID4
ID5
ID6
ID7
cbfID1
cbfID2
cbfID3
cbfID4
cbfID5
cbfID6
cbfID7
cbfID7
cbfID5 cbfID6
bfID1 bfID2 bfID3 bfID4
Tree Dictionary
Hierarchical Customized Bloom filters Hierarchical Index
cbfID1 cbfID2 cbfID3 cbfID4
Figure 7: Example of index structure and index construc-
tion process of hierarchical customized Bloom filters. ID1,
ID2, ID3, ID4, ID5, ID6, and ID7 are pseudonyms, labelling a
customized Bloom filter cbfIDi . The customized Bloom filter
cbfIDi is either directly or indirectly (colored blue) generated
from a Bloom filter (or multiple Bloom filters). For example,
cbfID1 ismapped directly from bfID1 while cbfID5 is indirectly
mapped from bfID1 and bfID2 .
Bloom filters. We show 4 patients, 7 customized Bloom filters,
and 4 standard Bloom filters. The customized Bloom filters, cbfID1 ,
cbfID2 , cbfID3 , cbfID4 , are constructed based on the standard Bloom
filters (indirectly from patients’ genomic data) by the hospital
and sent to the CSP. The remaining customized Bloom filters,
cbfID5 , cbfID6 , cbfID7 , are generated by the CSP according to the tree
structure, where cbfID5 = cbfID1 |cbfID2 , cbfID6 = cbfID3 |cbfID4 , and
cbfID7 = cbfID5 |cbfID6 (| represents bitwise OR operation).
5.2.5 Index merging (at the CSP) - IndexMerge. The index merg-
ing algorithm is invoked by the CSP once a high number of indices
are received from different hospitals. The goal is to reconstruct an
efficient index to replace all the stored indices without any loss in
terms of utility and privacy.
We describe the IndexMerge algorithm in the following. The de-
tails of the algorithm are also given in Appendix D. The CSP first
initializes a temporary dictionary Dicttemp and a set Υ. Dicttemp
is applied to store the pair of pseudonym and corresponding cus-
tomized Bloom filter. The set Υ is used to store pairs including a
public key and the corresponding random string. For each index,
the CSP resolves it into a tree Tri , a dictionary DictCBFi , a public key
PKi,1, and a string ri . PKi,1 and ri are collected into the set ϒ. Then,
each leaf node n of Tri is read and the value of entry DictCBFi [n.IDi ]
is added into the Dicttemp with the entry constructed by the con-
catenation of n.IDi and ri . The reason of concatenating n.IDi and
ri is to avoid the same pseudonym appearing in different hospitals.
After all the indices are processed, the CSP runs hierarchical clus-
tering algorithm HC over the Dicttemp and outputs the new tree
structure TrM and dictionary DictBFM . The output of the algorithm
is a merged index MI consisting of Υ, TrM , and DictCBFM .
An alternative faster approach for IndexMerge is to merge the
roots of the hierarchical indices instead of merging all the leaves
from scratch. In this way, in the new hierarchical index, each leaf
becomes a root of the original hierarchical index. The advantage of
this fast approach is the reduced time to build the new index. Using
the faster approach, the time complexity of IndexMerge decreases
fromO(N logN ) toO(n logn), whereN is the total number of leaves
and n is the total number of roots. The disadvantage is that the new
index does not precisely cluster all the similar nodes into a cluster
across hospitals. This may result in increased search time since the
time complexity of search is determined by the search path from
the root of the index to all the matching leaves. We implement and
evaluate the performance of this faster approach in Section 7.
5.3 Client Authorization
Upon a hospital i receives an authorization request from a client,
the hospital makes a decision on whether to allow its genomic data
to be accessed or not. If the hospital approves the request, a shared
key is generated and sent to the CSP and a success message is sent
back to the client along with the keys K and Kβi . Otherwise, a
failure message is sent to the client. The shared key is used by the
CSP to transform the client’s query token into a searchable token
over ASI. We describe the shared key generation algorithm in the
following. The details of the algorithm are also given in Appendix F.
The input of the algorithm includes two keys Ki and Kc and a set
Si,SNP of SNPs. Ki and Si,SNP are from hospital i , while Kc is from
client c . Si,SNP is the set of SNPs that the hospital allows the client
to access. The hospital generates the first part of the shared key (δi )
by computing дKc /Ki2 . Then, for each SNP in Si,SNP, the hospital
executes the following two procedures. First, the hash function
H1 is invoked with the input SNP and the hash result is raised
to the power 1/Kc . Second, the previous outcome is added into a
customized Bloom filter cbfi . The final output is the shared key
consisting of two parts: δi and cbfi .
5.4 Query Processing
As shown in Figure 4, query processing includes: query generation
(QueryGen and TokenGen), search (Search, SerachOverMergedIndex,
TokenAdjust, ASISearch), and decryption (ASIDecrypt).
5.4.1 Query generation - QueryGen and TokenGen. Query gen-
eration is executed by a client. It consists of two algorithms, Query-
Gen and TokenGen. The outcome of the QueryGen is used to search
over indices of target pseudonyms, while the outcome of the To-
kenGen is used to search over the encrypted ASIs.
QueryGen algorithm is detailed in Appendix G. The input of the
algorithm for a client c consists of the secret key K , a set Sc,SNP of
SNPs, a threshold εc representing theminimumnumber ofmatching
SNPs for a successful search, and a parameter kc to specify the
threshold for the maximum number of retrieved pseudonyms. Each
pair of SNP.ID and SNP.val inside Sc,SNP is concatenated and added
into a Bloom filter bfc . The procedure is same as the process in
index generation (as in Section 5.2.2). For each non-zero element
inside the bfc , the position pos is extracted and computed by calling
F using the secret key K as the input. The output is added into a set
E. The threshold εc is set by computing the number of non-zero bits
caused by the minimum number of SNPs. That is, count|S | · εc , where
count is the total number of non-zero bits caused by the input SNPs
and |S | is the total number of input SNPs. The final form of the
output is a tuple (E, εc ,kc ,σi ), where signature σi is generated by
the hospital i and sent to an approved client.
The details of the TokenGen algorithm are also given in Appen-
dix G. The input of the TokenGen algorithm includes a secret key
Kc and a set Sc,SNP of SNPs. For each SNP inside Sc,SNP, a hash
function H1 is called and the hash result is raised to the power
1/Kc for encryption and future token adjustment. Each outcome is
collected into a set TK. Finally, the algorithm outputs TK.
Eventually, the query sent to the CSP consists of the outputs of
algorithms QueryGen and TokenGen.
5.4.2 Search over a single index - Search. The search algorithm
is run by the CSP. For clarity of the presentation, we first consider
a scenario in which the search algorithm runs over a single index
(belonging to a single hospital). The search algorithm only uses
the first part Q of the query (encrypted input SNPs E) to traverse
the index from the root to the leaves considering the minimum
similarity threshold εc . The details are explained as follows (the
details of Search algorithm are also given in Appendix G).
The CSP receives a query Q from a client c and an index (∆i , ri )
from a hospital i . The CSP first resolves ∆i into a tree Tri , a dic-
tionary DictHi (which consists of pairs of patient pseudonym and
corresponding customized Bloom filter), and a public key PKi,1.
Query Q is resolved into a set E, a signature σi , and two thresh-
old values εc and kc . Then, the CSP builds a dictionary Dict with
only kc entries. The dictionary Dict stores pairs including (i) pa-
tient pseudonym and (ii) similarity score between corresponding
patient’s customized Bloom filter and the queried genome’s cus-
tomized Bloom filter.
Afterwards, the CSP verifies σi by running the verification func-
tion verify with the inputs PKi,1, σi , andH (PKi,1, ri ). If the verifica-
tion fails, the process is terminated. Otherwise, the CSP continues
to execute the following procedures. For each element ζ1 in the
set E, the CSP runs F with the inputs ζ1 and ri . The outcome ζ2
is added into a customized Bloom filter cbfc . After completing the
above process, the CSP reads the root (rooti ) from Tri and pushes
it into the queue qu.
Following steps are recursively executed until the qu is empty.
First, a node (n) is popped out from the qu. Second, the similar-
ity score sim is computed by using the cosine similarity between
Dict[n.IDi ] and cbfc . If sim is less than εc , then the next step is
skipped and step one is invoked again. If sim is greater than or
equal to εc , the property of n is checked. If n is a leaf, we call the
insert function (Insert) with the inputs Dict , n.IDi , and sim. The
details of Insert are given in Appendix G. The purpose of Insert
function is to insert the pair (IDi , sim) into Dict if Dict is not full or
there exits a pair that has smaller similarity score compared to the
current node. If n is not a leaf and there exists a left child (leftchild),
then leftchild is pushed into qu. If its right child (rightchild) exits,
then rightchild is pushed into qu. After this iteration is completed,
the CSP outputs the final result Dict.
5.4.3 Search over a merged index - SerachOverMergedIndex.
Compared to searching over a single index, searching over a merged
index mainly differs in two aspects. First, the CSP verifies all the
signatures submitted by the client instead of a single one (to rec-
ognize which hospitals in the merged index authorize the search).
Second, each random string attached to an authorized index is used
to generate a customized Bloom filter based on the submitted query.
We describe the SearchOverMergedIndex algorithm in the fol-
lowing. The details of the algorithm are also given in Appendix G.
The input of the SerachOverMergedIndex algorithm is a merged
index ϱ and a query Q from a client c . The query Q includes a set
E of encrypted SNPs, a set σs of signatures, and two thresholds εc
and kc . The merged index is resolved into a set Υ, a tree structure
TrM , and a dictionary DictBFM . For each signature σi ∈ σs , the CSP
verifies whether there exists a pair (PKi,1, ri ) ∈ Υ that matches
verify(PKi,1,σi ,H (PKi,1, ri )) = True. For each pair of (PKi,1, ri )
that matches the verification, the random string ri is extracted and
input into F with each ζ1 in E. The output ζ2 of F is added into
the customized Bloom filter cbfc . If the customized Bloom filter is
empty, it means no submitted signature is valid and the algorithm
returns None. Otherwise, cbfc is used to search over the tree TrM .
The process is similar to algorithm Search in Section 5.4.2 (details
are shown in Appendix G). The only difference is that the Insert
function is replaced by InsertConditionally. The details of Insert-
Conditionally are also given in Appendix G. Compared with Insert,
the difference is that in the InsertConditionally algorithm, the input
pseudonym IDi is the concatenation of a real patient pseudonym
and a random string that is required to be inside the authorized set.
The extra operation is to verify the legitimacy of the record and to
guarantee that all the records stored in Dict are authorized. Finally,
the SearchOverMergedIndex algorithm outputs Dict .
5.4.4 Token adjustment - TokenAdjust. The token received from
the client is not directly applicable for search over the ASI ciphertext.
The CSP needs to use a shared key to transform the received token
into an executable token (see Appendix G for details). The input
of the TokenAdjust algorithm consists of a set of tokens (TK) and a
shared key (δi , cbfi ) from a hospital i . For each token tk in TK, the
membership evaluation is conducted over the customized Bloom
filter cbfi . If cbfi (tk) , False, the bilinear mapping algorithm e is
called with inputs tk and δi . The result is collected into a set TK∗.
Otherwise, the current round of tk is skipped. Finally, the algorithm
outputs TK∗, which can be used to search the target ASIs.
5.4.5 ASI search -ASISearch. Given executable tokens (for search)
and ciphertext, the CSP can proceed with ASI search. To identify
an ASI, the tokens must match the access policy set on the ASI. The
access policy is set in the granularity of SNPs. For example, ASIs re-
lated to the diagnosis and treatment of breast cancer are encrypted
by considering the SNPs of BRCA gene as the required attributes.
That is, these attributes are applied to construct a polynomial that
outputs the value of a target parameter (secret key) when all the
required attributes are satisfied.
The details of ASI search are also given in Appendix G. The input
of the ASI search algorithm includes a set TK∗ of executable tokens,
a set ð of pseudonyms of patient records obtained from index search,
a dictionary DictCi containing pseudonym and ASI ciphertext pairs,
and a master key MKi of CPABE. For each pseudonym IDi in ð,
the entry DictASI[IDi ] associcates ciphertexts C2, C3 and a random
string τ . To decrypt ciphertext C2, the secret key (sk) of CPABE is
generated as follows. For each token tk∗ in TK∗, the hash function
H2 is called with the inputs τ and tk∗. The result is gathered into a
set ϑ . Then, the key generation algorithm CPABE.KeyGen is called
with the master key MKi of CPABE and ϑ . If the attribute set ϑ
does not match the access policy, the newly generated sk is null
and following operations are skipped. Otherwise, the following
procedures are executed to open the first layer of ciphertext C2.
The decryption algorithm (CPABE.Decrypt) of CPABE is invoked
with the inputs sk and C3. If the output symmetric key Kγi is not
null, the decryption algorithm AES.Decrypt of AES is invoked with
inputs Kγi and C2. The output C1 is collected into a set CC1 . Once
all the elements inside ð are accessed, the search algorithm outputs
the set CC1 that will be sent to the client.
5.4.6 ASI decryption - ASIDecrypt. Upon receiving the search
result, the client applies its secret key to decrypt the ciphertext
of ASI. For each ciphertext of retrieved result CC1 , the decryption
algorithm of AES is invoked to decrypt the ciphertext with the
input secret key Kβi assigned by hospital i . The plaintext ASI is
gathered into a set SASI. After all the ciphertext is decrypted, the
algorithm outputs SASI. The details of this operation are also given
in Appendix G.
6 PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In this section, based on the threat model described in Section 4.2,
we prove that our scheme meets the privacy goals. Following pre-
vious work [13, 18, 42], we consider the following as the allowed
leaked information to the adversary throughout the protocol: (i)
the size pattern, (ii) search pattern, and (iii) access pattern. Based
on this information, we define a “leakage function” formalizing
the information that is allowed to be learnt by the adversary. We
provide the details of the leakage function in Appendix H.
6.1 Privacy Definition
The privacy of the proposed scheme consists of two components.
The first is the privacy of genomic data and the second is the pri-
vacy of ASI. Privacy of genomic data can be further split into index
privacy and privacy of genome sequences. Genome sequences are
encrypted using AES and they are not involved in the query pro-
cessing. Thus, their privacy relies on the robustness of AES. Since
AES encryption achieves semantic security (e.g., CBC and CTR
modes [28]), the encrypted genome sequences are robust against
chosen plaintext attacks. The index privacy depends on the proba-
bility of reversing the customized Bloom filter to obtain the genome
sequences using the information from the query execution and an-
alyzing the customized Bloom filter. We formulate the privacy of
genomic data as a game between a challenger and an adversary.
First, the adversary selects two datasets DB0,SN P and DB1,SN P
of SNPs. Each item of dataset DBi,SN P (i ∈ {0, 1}) includes two
components: patient pseudonym and corresponding SNPs of the pa-
tient. Then, the adversary sends the two databases to the challenger.
The adversary is allowed to send adaptive queries with constraint
on the information leakage before making the final decision about
which dataset is utilized by the challenger. We provide the details
of this game in Appendix I. Similar to privacy of genomic data, we
also define the privacy of ASI via a game between a challenger and
the adversary. The formal definition of this game is in Appendix J.
6.2 Privacy Proof
For the proof of genomic data privacy, we show that in the genomic
data privacy game (in Appendix I), DB0,SN P and DB1,SN P are
indistinguishable for a PPT adversary.
Theorem 6.1. LetΠSN P={Setup, IndexGen,QueryGen, IndexMerge,
Search, SearchOverMergedIndex} be a set of algorithms of the pro-
posed scheme that are related to genomic data privacy. The scheme
ΠSN P is privacy-preserving if no PPT adversary can distinguish
DB0,SN P from DB1,SN P with non-negligible advantage at the end
of the game defined in Appendix I.
It is trivial to verify that the above theorem is consistent with the
privacy definition of genomic data. This leads us to the following
theorem.
Theorem 6.2. A PPT adversary cannot distinguish the view of
DB0,SN P from the view of DB1,SN P in the game defined in Ap-
pendix I if the applied AES encryption mode (e.g., CBC and CTR)
is semantically-secure and PRF is indistinguishable from a random
function.
We provide the proof of Theorem 6.2 in Appendix K. According
to Theorems 6.1 and 6.2, we conclude that the scheme ΠSN P is
privacy-preserving. The privacy of the ASI can be also proved
similarly.
7 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the efficiency and scalability of the pro-
posed scheme. Since the memory mapping technique [19, 26, 27] is
widely applied in our implementation of the proposed scheme (e.g.,
small part of the index is stored in memory and the remaining is
stored on the disk), a stable memory address is required to measure
the memory usage for different scenarios. Due to this requirement,
we first conducted experiments on a single machine to show the
efficiency of the proposed scheme and to analyze the run-time un-
der different scenarios. Due to the resource constraints of a single
machine, we then turned to Amazon EC2 platform [2] for running
large-scale experiments to show the scalability of the proposed
scheme. In all experiments, the length of security parameter of RSA
signature is set to 3096 bits. We use RSA only for the digital signa-
ture and it is only computed once per query by the data owner. Thus,
it has a negligible effect on the overall performance. Index is built
with a key (K) of size 256 bits and the genomic data is encrypted
using AES with a key (Kβi ) of size 256 bits. The asymmetric curve
used in bilinear mapping is set toMNT224 and the symmetric curve
applied in CPABE is set to SS512. The bilinear mapping is applied
when the authorization protocol runs, while the CPABE is called
for the ASI encryption. In our implementation, both MNT224 and
SS512 provide 90 bits of security. The capacity of Bloom filter is set
to 221, and maximum false positive rate of the Bloom filter is set to
0.01. Also, in all experiments, we generated each query by setting
the threshold for the minimum number of matching SNPs (εc ) to 90
percent of the total input SNPs and the threshold for the number
of retrieved results (kc ) to 5. In addition, the number of SNPs in a
query is equal to the number of SNPs per patient, if not specified
otherwise. The client is assumed to be authorized to access all the
hospitals’ data. Finally, we run each experiment 10 times and report
the average performance.
7.1 Experiments on a Single Local Machine
We ran the single machine experiments using a computer with
Ubuntu system, i7 CPU, 32GB RAM, and 500GB hard disk.
7.1.1 Data Model. We used the rsnps tool [4] to obtain all the
raw patient files from the publicly available OpenSNP dataset [1].
The whole dataset includes 3477 individuals and its plaintext size
is 55GB. We first converted the raw patient files into VCF format
using an open source software called personal-genome-analysis [23].
Eventually, we ended up with 2850 valid VCF files. For the affiliated
sensitive information (ASI), we also used the OpenSNP dataset. In
total, we collected 7388 ASIs and we randomly assigned them to
the patients in varying numbers. The number of SNPs associated
to an ASI varies from 20 to 2000.
7.1.2 Results. In our Bloom filter settings, the false positive rate
is 1 percent for an input size of 2 million SNPs. When the input
size increases to 3 million SNPs, the false positive rate increases
to 6 percent. However, in our experiments, we did not observe
such a high accuracy loss. The reason is that in the dataset few
patient records had 3 million SNPs. Most patient records had around
2 million SNPs, so that the precision is at least 99 percent in all
experiments.
We first evaluated the proposed mechanism when a hospital has
10, 100, 1000, and 2850 patients and each patient has 20 SNPs. The
Table 1: Performance (in terms of time cost in seconds and
storage cost) of the proposed scheme with different number
of patients in a hospital’s database. In all scenarios, each pa-
tient has 20 SNPs.
Number of patient records 10 100 1000 2850
IndexGen (s) 0.001 0.01 0.065 0.188
HierarchicalIndexGen (s): 0.24 23.5 2351 19772
QueryGen (s) 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Search (s) 0.037 0.386 3.858 10.036
Index Size in RAM (B) 7.4K 47.3K 355K 1005K
Index Size in Disk (B) 45.5M 476.8M 4.68G 13.3G
Query Size (B) 8.28K 8.28K 8.28K 8.28K
Table 2: Performance (in terms of time cost in seconds and
storage cost) of the proposed scheme with different number
of SNPs per patient. In all scenarios, the hospital has 2850
patients.
Number of SNPs per patient 200 2000 3350221
IndexGen (s) 0.65 2.92 175.86
HierarchicalIndexGen (s): 19775 19799 19936
QueryGen (s) 0.005 0.052 2.92
Search (s) 10.93 11.00 11.59
Index Size in the RAM (B) 1005K 1005K 1005K
Index Size in the Disk (B) 13.3G 13.3G 13.3G
Query Size (B) 51.3K 482K 961883.35K
results are shown in Table 1. We observed that the time cost of
QueryGen is constant, while the time costs of IndexGen and Search
increases linearly with the increasing patient records. Furthermore,
the growth rate of the time cost of HierarchicalIndexGen is approxi-
mately equal to the square of the growth rate of the patient records.
In addition, the memory and disk storage requirements increase
linearly with the number of patients.
Then, we considered the scenario that includes a hospital with
2850 patients and each patient having 200, 2000, and 3350221 SNPs
(whole sequence), respectively. The results are shown in Table 2.
We observed that the time costs of IndexGen and QueryGen algo-
rithms increase almost linearly with the increasing number of SNPs
per patient. We also observed that the time costs of Search and
HierarchicalIndexGen algorithms do not strongly correlate to the
number of SNPs per patient; there is only slight increase in time
cost when the number of SNPs increases dramatically. The index
size is independent of number of SNPs. However, the size of the
query increases linearly with the increasing number of used SNPs.
Next, we evaluated the index merging algorithm with 100, 200,
280, and 500 hospitals. Each hospital is assignedwith 10 patients and
each patient has 20 SNPs. The results are shown in Table 3. Notably,
we observed that the time cost of IndexMerge algorithm increases
quadratically with the increasing number of hospitals. In addition,
we also evaluated the fast approach for IndexMerge (introduced
in Section 5.2.5). Our results show that the fast approach is more
than 290 times faster than the above method, while the search time
over the merged index increases around 6 percent with the fast
approach.
As discussed, the benefit of applying the IndexMerge algorithm
is to reduce the search time (i.e., to search over a merged index of
multiple hospitals rather than searching over separate indices of
individual hospitals). To justify this, we analyzed and compared
the time costs of the Search and SearchOverMergeIndex algorithms.
Table 3 shows that the time cost of Search algorithm increases lin-
early with the increasing number of hospitals while the time cost of
Table 3: Performance of index merging algorithm (in terms
of time cost in seconds) with different number of hospitals.
Each hospital has 10 patients and each patient has 20 SNPs.
Number of Hospitals 100 200 280 500
IndexMerge (s) 2363 9059 18895 59982
SearchOverMergedIndex (s) 3.9 7.68 10.7 18.4
Search (s) 5.8 10.8 15.2 27.2
Table 4: Comparison of the proposedmechanismwithWang
et al.’s scheme [38]. k and l are the number of iterations and
adopted hash functions respectively.
Protocol one in [38]
k l Run-time (s) Accuracy
3 256 1697 90%
5 256 2683 96%
Protocol two in [38]
k l Run-time (s) Accuracy
3 256 730 93%
5 256 1060 96%
Proposed mechanism
Bloom filter
capacity error rate Run-time (s) Accuracy
221 0.01 11.59 ≥ 99 %
SearchOverMergedIndex algorithm increases sub-linearly. When the
number of hospitals reaches 100, SearchOverMergedIndex algorithm
has significant advantage compared to the Search algorithm.
We also compared the proposed mechanism with the state-of-
the-art, includingWang et al.’s [38], Asharov et al.’s [5], and Thomas
et al.’s [33] schemes. We did the comparison on a single hospital’s
dataset (as compliant with the settings in [38] and [5]), in which
the number of patients is 2850, the number of SNPs per patient is
3350221 (the whole sequence), and the query includes all 3350221
SNPs. We first implemented Wang et al.’s scheme [38] including (i)
protocol one, which includes a bucketing technique to improve the
secure computation of set difference size and (ii) protocol two, which
replaces the square operation of protocol one with an estimation of
normal distribution. We show the results in Table 4. We observed
that our proposed scheme performs almost 63 times faster than the
best case of protocol two of Wang et al.’s scheme. Moreover, our
scheme provides higher accuracy than [38]. Next, we compared
the proposed scheme with Asharov et al.’s [5] and and Thomas et
al.’s [33] schemes using the performance numbers reported in their
papers. We show the comparison result in Table 5. We observed that
the running times of Asharov et al.’s and Thomas et al’s schemes are
sensitive to the number of used SNPs in the query. The run-times
of [5] and [33] increase linearly with the number of SNPs in the
query while the run-time of our proposed scheme remains constant.
For example, when the number of SNPs in the query reaches to
3350221, the query times of both Asharov et al.’s and Thomas et al.’s
schemes exceed 1100 seconds, which is more than 95 times slower
than our proposed scheme.
Next, we evaluated the performance of ASI sharing focusing on
a single ASI with 20, 200, and 2000 associated SNPs, respectively.
We first assumed that the index search result only contains one
pseudonym and each patient record only contains one ASI. The
results are shown in the Table 6. We observed that the time costs of
Encrypt, SharedKeyGen, TokenGen, TokenAdjust, and ASISearch algo-
rithms increase linearly with the increasing number of associated
SNPs with the ASI. On the other hand, the time cost of ASIDecrypt
algorithm is almost constant with increasing number of SNPs.
Table 5: Comparison of the proposed scheme with Asharov
et al.’s [5] and Thomas et al.’s [33] schemes. ⊥means the ac-
curacy is not reported.
# of # of SNPs per patient Run-time (s) Accuracy
patients (# of SNPs in the query)
Asharov et al.’s scheme
100 714 0.26 94.28%
100 1950 0.68 99.67%
Thomas et al.’s scheme
1000 1000 1.2 ⊥
1000 75M 24480 ⊥
Proposed mechanism
2850 20 10.036 ≥ 99%
2850 2000 11 ≥ 99%
2850 3350221 11.59 ≥ 99 %
Table 6: Performance (in terms of time cost in seconds) of
ASI sharing mechanism with a single ASI that is associated
with different number of SNPs.
Number of SNPs 20 200 2000
ASIEncrypt (s) 2.95 28.87 293.4
SharedKeyGen (s) 0.092 0.86 8.55
TokenGen (s) 0.083 0.83 8.3
TokenAdjust (s) 0.487 4.86 48.6
ASISearch (s) 2.3 24.7 244.3
ASIDecrypt (ms) 0.066 0.07 0.068
Table 7: Performance (in terms of time cost in seconds) of
ASI sharing scheme for different number of ASIs. Each ASI
has 20 associated SNPs.
Number of ASIs 10 100 1000 7388
ASIEncrypt (s) 29.055 290.007 2885.7 21298.1
SharedKeyGen (s) 0.094 0.093 0.097 0.11
TokenGen (s) 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084
TokenAdjust (s) 0.487 0.493 0.494 0.494
ASISearch (s) 2.506 3.74 14.39 89.3
ASIDecrypt (ms) 0.065 0.074 0.076 0.073
Finally, we considered a more general case in which each pa-
tient has different number of ASIs, each having 20 associated SNPs.
The result are shown in Table 7. We observed that with increasing
number of ASIs, the time costs of SharedKeyGen, TokenGen, Toke-
nAdjust, and ASIDecrypt algorithms are almost constant. Also, the
time costs of Encrypt and ASISearch algorithms increase linearly
with increasing number of ASIs.
7.2 Experiments on Amazon EC2
To show the scalability of our scheme, we also conducted experi-
ments on Amazon EC2 [2] and especially evaluated the QueryGen,
Search, IndexMerge, and SearchOverMergedIndex algorithms.
7.2.1 Data Model. Using genomic data of 2850 patients (from
OpenSNP dataset [1]), we extracted the statistics of the observed
SNPs. Using these, we synthetically generated 10000 patients, which
is consistent with the previous work, e.g., [38], [33]. In detail, we
first assigned SNP IDs to 10000 patient records based on the ex-
tracted distribution. Then, following the extracted statistics, we
assigned a SNP value for each SNP of each patient record. We then
assigned the generated patients to 100 hospitals (each hospital has
100 patient records). In the following experiments, we first built
the index for each hospital. The index is built based on all the SNPs
(the maximum is 3350221) of each patient record.
7.2.2 Results. First, we evaluated the performance of the In-
dexGen and HierarchialIndexGen algorithms. We observed that the
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Figure 8: Experimental result from Amazon EC2 platform.
time costs for IndexGen is 742.51 seconds and HierarchicalIndexGen
is 896.93 seconds for building a hierarchical index. In Figure 8a,
we show the performance of the QueryGen algorithm for different
number of SNPs in the query. We observed that the time cost of
QueryGen increases slightly with increasing number of SNPs in
the query. We then evaluated the time cost of the Search algorithm
and observed (in Figure 8a) that search time increases linearly with
increasing number of SNPs in the query.
Next, in Figure 8b, we show the performance of the IndexMerge
algorithm. For the evaluation of the IndexMerge algorithm, we
adopted the fast approach described in Section 5.2.5. We observed
that the time cost of the IndexMerge algorithm increases superlin-
early when increasing the number of indices. Finally, in Figure 8c,
we show the time cost of the SearchOverMergedIndex algorithm
while varying the number of merged indices and SNPs in the query.
We observed that the number of SNPs has a limited impact on the
search efficiency compared to the number of indices. Moreover,
we observed that when the number of indices reaches 50, the time
cost of sequentially calling Search is at least 170 seconds, while
the maximum time cost of SearchOverMergedIndex is 166 seconds.
This also supports the experimental result obtained on the local
machine, which shows that 100 indices are enough to benefit from
index merging.
8 DISCUSSION
Here, we discuss the evaluation results and potential applications.
8.1 Evaluation Results and Practicality
In general, we observe that the experimental results (in Section 7)
on a single machine and Amazon EC2 are consistent. In addition,
we observe that the search process benefits from merging process
when the number of indices (e.g., hospitals) exceeds a certain num-
ber (50 in our large-scale experiments). Based on the results of the
evaluation, we show that the proposed scheme is scalable with
respect to increasing number of hospitals, number of patients per
hospital, number of SNPs per patient, and number of ASIs per pa-
tient. We also show the superiority of the proposed scheme with
respect to the state-of-the-art in terms of its practicality. In particu-
lar, we show that the proposed scheme has significant advantage
for scenarios that include large number of SNPs per patient and
large number of SNPs in the query.
The most time consuming part of the proposed scheme is the
IndexMerge algorithm, which is conducted by the CSP and executed
infrequently. We showed that a fast alternative of the IndexMerge
significantly reduces the run-time while it slightly increases the
time needed for the search operation. Also, the implementation
of IndexMerge can be further optimized (especially for the fast
approach) via concurrent programming.
8.2 Alternative Usecases
The proposed scheme can also be used in existing health-related
online social networks. For instance, the well-known online health
information exchange platform PatientsLikeMe [3] (PLM) already
attracts more than 0.6 million members including physicians, re-
searchers, and patients. Currently PLM includes only the ASI (phe-
notype, ethnicity, disease conditions, treatment, etc.) of its members.
However, it is not very far fetched to assume that such a platform
also starts storing genomic data of its members in the near fu-
ture. PLM is a popular platform even among physicians to learn
about the treatment procedures of other physicians. Using our pro-
posed scheme, genomes of individuals can be kept encrypted at the
PLM. PLM can index such genomes and let the physicians conduct
privacy-preserving similar patient tests on them. As a result of
the test, the PLM can connect the physicians of the corresponding
patients so they can exchange information about their patients.
Similarly, using the proposed scheme, and assuming a cloud-based
genomics service provider (such as Google Genomics) act as the
CSP, research labs and hospitals that keep their data on the cloud
can query each other’s databases in a privacy-preserving way.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a privacy-preserving and efficient
solution for the similar patient search problem among several hospi-
tals. To achieve this, we have proposed a novel privacy-preserving
index structure. To improve the efficiency of the search operation,
we have developed a hierarchical index structure (to index each hos-
pital’s dataset with low memory requirement) and a novel privacy-
preserving index merging mechanism that generates a common
search index from individual indices of each hospital. We have also
considered the search for medical information (e.g., diagnosis and
treatment) that is associated with genomic data of a patient. We
have developed a scheme that allows access to this information
via a fine-grained access control policy. Via simulations on real
and synthetic genomic data, we have shown the practicality and
efficiency of the proposed scheme. We believe that the proposed
scheme will further facilitate the use of genomic data in clinical set-
tings and pave the way for personalized medicine. In future work,
we will focus on supporting dynamic datasets and we will extend
our scheme to support batch search.
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Appendices
A BACKGROUND ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC
TOOLS
Here, we provide background on common cryptographic tools such
as asymmetric bilinear groups and Bloom filter.
A.1 Asymmetric Bilinear Groups
Let G1 and G2 be two distinct groups of prime order p and д1 ∈ G1
and д2 ∈ G2 be the generators of G1 and G2, respectively. Let e :
G1×G2 → GT be a function which maps two elements fromG1 and
G2 to a target groupGT of prime orderp. The tuple (G1,G2,GT ,p, e)
is an asymmetric bilinear group if following properties hold:
(a) the group operations in G1, G2, GT can be computed efficiently.
(b) e can be computed efficiently.
(c) e is non-degenerate: e(д1,д2) , 1.
(d) e is bilinear: for all a,b ∈ Zp , e(дa1 ,дb2 ) = e(д1,д2)ab .
A.2 Bloom Filter
A Bloom filter is a bit array used to efficiently check the existence
of an element in a set [11]. At the beginning, all the values of the
array elements are set to 0. There exists a family of k different hash
functions, each functionmapping a data item to a position inside the
array. Consequently, each data item is represented by k non-zero
bits inside the bit array. Even if a data item has not been mapped
to the bit array, there is still a probability for the k corresponding
bits to be non-zero because of the other data items represented in
the array. Such a situation is called “false positive”. Letm be the
length of the bit array and n be the number of distinct data items
mapped to the array. The false positive probability is expressed as
(1 − e −(kn)m )k , and it gets the smallest value when k = ln 2mn .
B SYSTEM’S CORE PROCEDURES
We provide the core procedures of the proposed scheme in Table 8.
C KEY PARAMETERS AND FUNCTIONS
We list the frequently used parameters and functions in Table 9.
D DETAILS OF THE ALGORITHMS IN THE
INITIALISATION PHASE IN SECTION 5.2
Here, we provide the details of the algorithms introduced in the
initialization phase of the proposed scheme (in Section 5.2). We
show the details of the index generation, ASI encryption, hierar-
chical clustering, and index merging in Algorithms 1, 2, 3, and 4,
respectively.
Algorithm 1 IndexGen
Input: a secret key K of PRF, dictionary DictBFi , public key PKi,1
of signature, private key SKi,1 of signature
Output: a pair ∆i of dictionary and public key, random string ri ,
and signature σi
1: initialize a dictionary DictCBFi
2: ri
R←− {0, 1}λ
3: for all IDi ∈ DictBFi do
4: initialize a customized Bloom filter cbfIDi
5: bfIDi ← DictBFi [IDi ]
6: for all integer pos ∈ [1,|bfIDi |] s. t. bfIDi [pos]=1 do
7: ζ1 ← F (K , pos)
8: ζ2 ← F (ri , ζ1)
9: cbfIDi .add(ζ2)
10: DictCBFi [IDi ] ← cbfIDi
11: hr ← H0(PKi,1, ri )
12: σi ← Siдn(SKi ,hr )
13: ∆i = (DictCBFi , PKi,1, ri )
14: return ∆i ,σi
Algorithm 2 ASIEncrypt
Input: a secret key Ki of hospital i , a secret key Kβi of symmetric
encryption, dictionary DictASIi storing ASI plaintext
Output: dictionary DictCi storing ASI ciphertext
1: initialize a dictionary DictCi
2: for all IDi ∈ DictASIi do
3: CIDi ← ϕ
4: for all (ASI, SASIIDi ,SNP) ∈ Dict
ASI
i [IDi ] do
5: τ
R←− {0, 1}λ
6: θ ← ϕ
7: for all (SNP.ID, SNP.val) ∈ SASIIDi ,SNP do
8: v ← SNP.ID ◦ SNP .val
9: h ← H2(τ , e(H1(v),д2)1/Ki )
10: θ ← θ ∪ h
11: C1 ← AES.Enc(Kβi ,ASI)
12: Kγi
R←− GT
13: C2 ← AES.Enc(Kγi ,C1)
14: A ← CPABE.AP(θ )
15: C3 ← CPABE.Enc(PKi,2,Kγi ,A)
16: CIDi ← CIDi ∪ (C3,C2,τ )
17: DictCi [IDi ] ← CIDi
18: return DictCi
Algorithm 3 HierarchicalIndexGen
Input: unclustered index ∆i
Output: hierarchical index ∆Hi
1: (DictCBFi , PKi,1, ri ) ← ∆i
2: (Tri ,DictHi ) ← HC(DictCBFi )
3: ∆Hi ← (Tri ,DictHi , PKi,1, ri )
4: return ∆Hi
Algorithm 4 IndexMerge
Input: a set of indices Iind
Output: a merged index ϱ
1: initialize a dictionary Dicttemp
2: Υ ← ϕ
3: for all ind ∈ Iind do
4: (Tri ,DictCBFi , PKi,1, ri ) ← ind
5: Υ ← Υ ∪ (PKi,1, ri )
6: for all leaf node ∈ Tri do
7: Dicttemp [node.ID ◦ ri ] ← DictCBFi [node.ID]
8: (TrM ,DictCBFM ) ← HC(Dicttemp )
9: ϱ ← (Υ, TrM ,DictCBFM )
10: return ϱ
E ILLUSTRATION OF ASI ENCRYPTION
PROCESS
We discuss the ASI encryption process in Section 5.2.3. We show
an illustration of ASI encryption in Figure 9.
Table 8: System’s Core Procedures. The first column includes the names of the APIs. The inputs and outputs of the APIs are
shown in columns 2 and 3. The last column represents the corresponding module of the API in Figures 2, 3, and 4. The value
of the last column consists of two parts. The first part (before dot) represents the number of the corresponding figure and the
second part represents the number of the module in the figure.
API Call Input Output Steps in Figure 2, 3 and 4
Setup λ initial functions and parameters 2.1
IndexGen K , DictBFi , PKi,1, SKi ∆i , ri , σi 2.2
SNPEncrypt Kαi , Si,SNP Ci,SNP 2.3
ASIEncrypt Ki , Kβi , Dict
ASI
i Dict
C
i 2.4
HierarchicalIndexGen ∆i ∆Hi 2.5
IndexMerge Iind ϱ 2.6
SharedKeyGen Ki , Kc , Si,SN P δi , cb fi 3
QueryGen K , Sc , εc , kc ,σi Q 4.1
TokenGen Kc , Sc,SN P TK 4.2
Search ∆Hi , ri , Q Dict 4.3
SearchOverMergedIndex ϱ, Q Dict 4.3
TokenAdjust TK , δi , cbfi TK∗ 4.4
ASISearch TK∗, DictCi , ð, MKi CC1 4.5
ASIDecrypt Sβi , C SASI 4.6
ASI
AES.Enc(K i, ASI)
C1
C2
AES.Enc(K i, C1)
CPABE.Enc
C3
Kγi
Figure 9: Overview of ASI encryption. ASI is first encrypted
using AES encryption and secret key Kβi to obtainC1. Then,
C1 is encrypted using AES and with secret key Kγi to obtain
C2. Finally, Kγi is encrypted to C3 by using CPABE.
F DETAILS OF THE ALGORITHMS IN THE
CLIENT AUTHORIZATION PHASE IN
SECTION 5.3
Here, we provide the details of the algorithm (in Section 5.3) to
generate a shared key in the client authorization phase of the pro-
posed scheme. The details to generate a shared key is shown in
Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 SharedKeyGen
Input: a secret key Ki of hospital i , a secret key Kc of a client,a
set Si,SN P of authorized SNPs
Output: shared key (δi , cb fi )
1: initialize a customized Bloom filter cb fi
2: δi ← дKc /Ki2
3: for all (SNP .ID, SNP .val) ∈ Si,SN P do
4: v ← SNP .ID ◦ SNP .val
5: tv ← H1(v)1/Kc
6: cb fi .add(tv )
7: return (δi , cb fi )
G DETAILS OF THE ALGORITHMS IN THE
QUERY PROCESSING PHASE IN
SECTION 5.4
Here, we provide the details of the algorithms introduced in the
query processing phase of the proposed scheme (in Section 5.4). We
show the details of query generation, token generation, search con-
ducted on a single index, and the Insert function in Algorithms 6, 7,
8, and 9, respectively. We also show the detailed steps of search over
a merged index, InsertConditionally function, and token adjustment
in Algorithms 10, 11, and 12, respectively. Finally, we show the
details of ASI search and ASI decryption in Algorithms 13 and 14.
H LEAKAGE FUNCTION
The leakage function plays an important role in the privacy analy-
sis as it defines the information that is allowed to be acquired by
the adversary. Following previous work [13, 18, 42], we consider
the following as the allowed leaked information: (i) the size pat-
tern, (ii) search pattern, and (iii) access pattern. The size pattern
includes the size of encrypted query, encrypted genomic sequences,
encrypted index, and encrypted ASI. The search pattern represents
Algorithm 6 QueryGen
Input: a secret key K of PRF, a set Sc of SNPs, threshold εc , top kc ,
and signature σi
Output: query Q
1: initialize a Bloom filter b f
2: for all (SNP .ID, SNP .val) ∈ Sc,SN P do
3: b f .add(SNP .ID ◦ SNP .val)
4: E ← ϕ
5: count ← 0
6: for all integer pos ∈ [1, |b f |] such that b f [pos] = 1 do
7: ζ1 ← F (K ,pos)
8: count← count+1
9: E ← E ∪ ζ1
10: εc ← count|S | · εc
11: return Q← (E, εc , kc , σi )
Algorithm 7 TokenGen
Input: a secret key Kc , a set Sc,SN P of SNPs
Output: token TK
1: TK ← ϕ
2: for all (SNP .ID, SNP .val) ∈ Sc,SN P do
3: v ← SNP .ID ◦ SNP .val
4: tk ← H1(v)1/Kc
5: TK ← TK ∪ tk
6: return TK
Algorithm 8 Search
Input: hierarchical index ∆Hi , random string ri , and query Q =(E, εc ,kc ,σi )
Output: a dictionary Dict with kc entries
1: (Tri ,DictHi , PKi,1) ← ∆Hi
2: Dict = ϕ
3: if ver f iy(PKi,1,σi ,H0(PKi,1, ri )) = False) then
4: return None
5: initialize a queue qu and a customized Bloom filter cb fc
6: for all ζ1 ∈ E do
7: ζ2 ← F (ri , ζ1)
8: cb fc .add(ζ2)
9: rooti ← Tri
10: qu .push(rooti )
11: while qu is not empty do
12: n← qu .pop()
13: sim ← Dict
H
i [n .IDi ]·cbfc
|DictHi [n .IDi ] | · |cbfc |
▷ cosine similarity
14: if sim ≥ εc then
15: if n is a leaf then
16: Dict ← Insert(Dict ,n.IDi , sim)
17: else
18: if n has a left child then
19: leftchild ← the left child of the n
20: qu.push(leftchild)
21: if n has a right child then
22: rightchild ← the right child of the n
23: qu.push(rightchild)
24: return Dict
Algorithm 9 Insert
Input: dictionary Dict , pseudonym IDi , similarity score sim
Output: dictionary Dict
1: if len(Dict )<kc then
2: Dict(IDi ) ← sim
3: return Dict
4: find the pair (IDtemp , simtemp ) such that
5: simtemp =min(IDtemp,simtemp )∈Dict
6: if simtemp < sim then
7: delete the pair (IDtemp , Dictk [IDtemp ]) from Dict
8: Dict[IDi ] ← sim
9: return Dict
Algorithm 10 SearchOverMergedIndex
Input: Merged index ϱ, query Q = (E,σs , εc ,kc )
Output: dictionary Dict with kc entries
1: (Υ,TrM ,DictCBFM ) ← ϱ
2: initialize dictionary Dict with kc entries
3: initialize a customized Bloom filter cb fc
4: ℜ← ϕ
5: for all (PKi,1, ri ) ∈ Υ do
6: for all σi ∈ σs do
7: if veri f y(PKi,1,σi ,H (PKi,1, ri ))=False then
8: ℜ←ℜ∪ ri
9: for all ζ1 ∈ E do
10: ζ2 ← F (ri , ζ1)
11: cb fc .add(ζ2)
12: if cb fc , ϕ then
13: root ← TrM
14: initialize a queue qu
15: qu .push(root)
16: while qu is not empty do
17: n← qu .pop()
18: sim ← Dict
CBF
M [n .IDi ]·cbfc
|DictCBFM [n .IDi ] | · |cbfc |
▷ cosine similarity
19: if sim ≥ εc then
20: if n is a leaf then
21: Dict← InsertConditionally(Dict, θr , n.IDi , sim)
22: else
23: if n has a left child then
24: leftchild ← the left child of the n
25: qu.push(leftchild)
26: if n has a right child then
27: rightchild ← the right child of the n
28: qu.push(rightchild)
29: return Dict
Algorithm 11 InsertConditionally
Input: dictionary Dict , pseudonym IDi , random string set ℜr ,
similarity score sim
Output: dictionary Dict
1: (ID∗i , r∗i ) ← IDi
2: if r∗i ∈ ℜ then
3: Dict ← Insert(Dict , ID∗i , sim)
4: return Dict
Table 9: Key parameters and functions.
G1/G2/GT a group of prime order p
e a bilinear mapping from G1, G2 to GT
bf maps the input into a Bloom filter
cbf maps the input into a customized Bloom filter
DictBFi a dictionary of hospital i that stores pairs including
(i) pseudonym of a patient and (ii) Bloom filter
output of the corresponding patient’s genome
DictCBFi a dictionary of hospital i that stores {pseudonym,
customized Bloom filter} pairs
DictCBFM a merged dictionary from multiple hospitals
DictASIi a dictionary of hospital i that stores {pseudonym,
ASI plaintext} pairs
DictCi a dictionary of hospital i that stores {pseudonym,
ASI ciphertext} pairs
S a set of SNPs
Si,SNP a set of SNPs from hospital i
SASIii,SNP a set of SNPs related to ASIi from hospital i
H0 maps two strings to an random string
H1 maps a string to an element of group G1
H2 maps two elements from GT to a string
F a pseudorandom function (PRF)
K a secret key, used by all hospitals and
approved clients
Kc a secret key selected by a client
εc a threshold of minimum number of matching
SNPs set by client c
kc a threshold of maximum retrieved
result set by client c
Ki a secret key selected by hospital i for ASI
encryption and shared key generation
Kαi a symmetric encryption key of hospital i for SNP
encryption
Kβi a symmetric encryption key of hospital i for ASI
encryption, which is shared with authorized clients
Kγi a symmetric encryption key of hospital i randomly
selected from GT
PKi,1, SKi a pair of public/private keys selected by
hospital i for signature
PKi,2, MKi a pair of public and master keys of CPABE
selected by hospital i and shared with the CSP
Algorithm 12 TokenAdjust
Input: a set TK of raw tokens, a shared key (δi ,cb fi )
Output: a set TK∗ of valid tokens
1: TK∗ ← ϕ
2: for all tk ∈ TK such that cb fi (tk) = True do
3: tk∗ ← e(tk,δi )
4: TK∗ ← TK∗ ∪ tk∗
5: return TK∗
the relationship between a query and the retrieved result. The ac-
cess pattern represents the access path to certain data records. To
define the leakage function formally, we first present the formal
definitions of the aforementioned patterns.
Algorithm 13 ASISearch
Input: valid token TK∗, encrypted ASI data DictCi , a set ð of
pseudonyms, a master keyMKi of CPABE
Output: a set CC1 of ASI ciphertext
1: CC1 ← ϕ
2: for all IDi ∈ ð do
3: for all (C3,C2,τ ) ← DictCi [IDi ] do
4: ϑ ← ϕ
5: for all tk ∈ TK∗ do
6: h ← H2(τ , tk)
7: ϑ ← ϑ ∪ h
8: sk ← CPABE.KeyGen(MKi ,ϑ )
9: if sk , ϕ then
10: Kγi ← CPABE.Decrypt(sk,C3)
11: if Kγi , False then
12: C1 ← AES .Decrypt(Kγi ,C2)
13: CC1 ← CC1 ∪C1
14: return CC1
Algorithm 14 ASIDecrypt
Input: a secret key Kβi of symmetric encryption, a set CC1 of ASI
ciphertext
Output: a set SASI of plaintext of ASIs
1: SASI ← ϕ
2: for all c ∈ C do
3: ASI ← AES .Decrypt(Kβi , c)
4: SASI ← SASI ∪ASI
5: return SASI
Size pattern (µ): Let CSNP={C1,SNP, · · · , Cn,SNP}, CASI={C1,ASI,· · · ,
Cn,ASI}, and Cind={(∆1,σ1), · · · , (∆m ,σm ) } be the ciphertexts of
genome sequences, ASI, and index stored at the CSP, respectively
(where n is the total number of records stored in the CSP and m
is the total number of indices). Also, let Q and TK be the client’s
query for the index and token of ASI, respectively. The size pattern
is defined as µ={|CSNP |, |CASI |, |Cind |, |Q |, |TK|}.
Search pattern (ν ): Let {q1, · · · ,qp } be p consecutive queries and
{S1,ASI · · · , Sq,ASI} be the corresponding retrieved ASIs. Then, ν is
defined as a two dimensional matrix and ν [i, j] = 1 if a retrieved
ASI exists in the jth position of the patient i’s record.
Access pattern (ξ ): Let Cind be the set of encrypted indices and
CASI be the set of encrypted ASIs at the CSP. Let {S1,ASI · · · , Sq,ASI}
be ASIs retrieved by queries {q1 = (Q1, TK1), · · · ,qp = (Qp , TKp )}.
Then, the access pattern is defined as ξ={(Cind (Q1),CASI(Cind (Q1),
TK1), S1,ASI), · · · , (Cind (Qp ), CASI(Cind (Qp ), TKp ), Sp,ASI) }.
The leakage function captures the leakage of the above defined
patterns and it is defined as follows.
Leakage function (L): Let CSNP, Cind , CASI, and q = (Q, TK) be
the encrypted genome sequences, encrypted index, encrypted ASIs,
and a query, respectively. The leakage function is defined as L =
{CSNP,Cind ,CASI,Q, TK, µ,ν , ξ }. The output of L is the revealed
bits that are not supposed to be disclosed.
The leakage functionL is used to control the information leakage
of allowed requests (e.g., query request).
I PRIVACY OF GENOMIC DATA
We formulate the privacy of genomic data as a game between a chal-
lenger and an adversary, which includes both privacy of index and
genome sequence. First, the adversary selects two datasetsDB0,SN P
and DB1,SN P of SNPs. Each item of dataset DBi,SN P (i ∈ {0, 1})
includes two components: patient pseudonym and corresponding
SNPs of the patient. Then, the adversary sends the two databases to
the challenger. The adversary is allowed to send adaptive queries
with constraint on the information leakage before making the final
decision about which dataset is utilized by the challenger.
Let ΠSN P={Setup, IndexGen, QueryGen, IndexMerge, Search,
SearchOverMergedIndex} be a set of algorithms of the proposed
scheme that are related to genomic data privacy. For a probabilis-
tic polynomial time (PPT) adversary Adv, the advantage function
ADV ΠSNPAdv is defined as follows. ADV
ΠSNP
Adv =Pr (b∗ = b) − 12 , where
b and b∗ are defined in the following game which evaluates the
probability of breaking the proposed scheme. We describe the key
steps of the game between the challenger and the adversary below.
Init:The adversaryAdv submits two datasetsDB0,SN P andDB1,SN P
to the challenger with the same number of records and index struc-
ture.
Setup: The challenger generates the initial functions, parameters,
and keys. Details can be found in Section 5.2.
Phase 1: The adversary is allowed to obtain the ciphertexts of
genome, index, and query by adapatively submitting ciphertext
requests, index requests, and query requests to the challenger.
Ciphertext request: The adversary selects a dataset of genome se-
quence and submits it to the challenger to request its ciphertext.
The selected dataset is not limited to DB0,SN P and DB1,SN P .
Index request: The adversary selects a dataset that is different from
DB0,SN P and DB1,SN P and submits it to the challenger to request
its index.
Challenge: The challenger randomly selects a bit b from {0, 1} and
encrypts DBb,SN P to generateCb,SN P . It also generates encrypted
index Cindb and sends Cb,SN P and Cindb to the adversary.
Phase 2: The adversary adaptively submits query request Q in
addition to the ciphertext and index requests described in the Phase
1.
Query request: The adversary selects target SNPs, sets two thresh-
olds, attaches the signature of target index, and sends them to the
challenger for asking the querywith constraintL(S0,SN P ,Q,Cind0 ) =L(S1,SN P ,Q,Cind1 ).
Guess: The adversary A outputs b∗ as a guess of b.
The privacy of the genomic data is preserved against selective
chosen plaintext attack if in the above scheme ΠSN P the adversary
Adv has negligible advantage. Explicitly, the advantage function
ADV ΠSNPAdv should be a negligible function in parameter λ.
J PRIVACY OF ASI
Similar to privacy of genomic data, we also define the privacy of ASI
via a game between a challenger and the adversary. In a nutshell,
the adversary sends two ASIs to a challenger and the adversary
sends adaptive queries with constraint on the leakage function
before providing its guess of the applied ASI. The formal definition
of this game is below.
Informally, the ASI privacy is defined as a game in which the
adversary sends two ASIs to a challenger and the adversary sends
adaptive queries with constraint on the leakage function before
providing its guess of the applied ASI. The formal definition is
defined as follows.
LetΠASI ={Setup,ASIEncrypt, SharedKeyGen, TokenGen, TokenAd-
just, ASISearch, ASIDecrypt} be a set of algorithms of the proposed
scheme that are related to ASIs. For a PPT adversaryAdv, the advan-
tage of wining the game is defined as ADV ΠASIAdv = Pr (b∗ = b) − 12 ,
where b∗ and b are defined in the following game.
Init: The adversary selects ASI0 and ASI1 with same size and num-
ber of associated SNPs and submits them to the challenger.
Setup: The challenger runs Setup to start the system with initial
functions, parameters, and keys. Details can be found in Section 5.2.
Phase 1: The adversary adaptively submits requests in one of the
following types:
Ciphertext request: The adversary submits an ASI associated to a
set of specified SNPs and requests for its ciphertext. The selected
ASI is not limited to the previously uploaded two ASIs.
Token request: The adversary submits a set of SNPs and requests
the corresponding search token.
Shared key request: The adversary submits a set of SNPs and re-
quests for a shared key with constraint that the shared key can
decrypt either both ASI0 and ASI1 or none of them.
Challenge: The challenger randomly selects a bit b from {0, 1} and
encrypts ASIb by calling function ASIEncrypt before sending the
result to the adversary.
Phase 2: The adversary repeats Phase 1.
Guess: The adversary outputs its guess b∗ for b.
We claim the scheme ΠASI is privacy-preserving against selec-
tive chosen plaintext attack if the PPT adversary Adv has negligible
advantage in winning the above game.
K PROOF OF THEOREM 6.2
Proof. We prove Theorem 6.2 by assuming if there exists an
adversary Adv that can distinguish the two views of DB0,SN P and
DB1,SN P , then there exists a simulator B that can break either the
semantic security of AES encryption or the randomness of PRF. In
the following, we follow the previously defined game (in Appendix I)
with a simulator B trying to break the proposed scheme.
Init: A simulator B selects and submits two datasets of genome
sequences DB∗0,SN P and DB
∗
1,SN P to the adversary Adv and chal-
lenger with same number of records and index structure.
Setup: The challenger runs Setup to set initial parameters and func-
tions.
Phase 1: The adversary adaptively submits one of the following
requests to the simulator B.
Ciphertexts request: B directly submits the dataset from adversary
to the challenger and sends the ciphertext from the challenger to
the adversary. The dataset is not limited to DB∗0,SN P and DB
∗
1,SN P .
Index request: The simulator B directly sends the submitted dataset
to the challenger and sends the returned index from the challenger
back to the adversary A. The submitted dataset is not among
DB∗0,SN P and DB
∗
1,SN P .
Challenge: The challenger randomly selects a bit b and generates
the ciphertext and index of DB∗b,SN P by invoking SNPEncrypt and
IndexGen, respectively. The challenger sends the newly generated
ciphertext and index to the simulator B. The simulator B sends
them to the adversary.
Phase 2: The adversary submits the following query request to
simulator B in addition to repeating the Phase 1.
Query request: Simulator B uploads the submitted query request to
the challenger and sends the result back to the adversary.
Guess: The adversary outputs its guess b∗ to the simulator B and
the simulator B outputs the same guess.
According to the initial assumption, the adversaryAdv has signif-
icant advantage in breaking the defined experiment in Appendix I.
In the proof, the described experiment strictly follows the defined
experiment, and hence the simulator B has significant advantage in
guessing the correct answer. Thus, the simulator B can distinguish
the ciphertext C∗0,SN P and index C
∗
ind0
from C∗1,SN P and index
C∗ind1 with significant advantage in the experiment. Since C
∗
b,SN P
is the ciphertext obtained from AES encryption and index C∗indb
is the output of a PRF, the simulator B successfully breaks one of
them if the simulator B cannot learn significant information from
the ciphertext request, index request, and query request.
First, we analyse the ciphertext request. Since each ciphertext
is generated as a result of AES encryption, the security is guar-
anteed by the robustness of AES. According to the assumption,
the adopted AES achieves semantic security and the simulator B
cannot learn significant information from the ciphertext. Second,
the index request is only applicable to the datasets that are different
from the challenged datasets. Moreover, each index is randomized
by a random string, and hence the simulator B cannot correlate
any two different indices. Third, the query request is constrained by
the leakage function. The request will be released if and only if the
request causes the same leakage of two challenged datasets. As the
leakage is the same, the simulator B cannot learn significant infor-
mation to distinguish the challenged ciphertext and index. Based on
the above analysis, we can conclude that in the above experiment,
the simulator B should break either the AES encryption or the
randomness of PRF.
□
